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Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between Pascal’s wager, faith, and hope. First, I 
argue that many who take Pascal’s wager have genuine faith that God exists. The person of faith 
and the wagerer have several things in common, including a commitment to God and positive 
cognitive and conative attitudes toward God’s existence. I also argue that if one’s credences in 
theism are too low to have faith, the wagerer can still hope that God exists, another commitment-
justifying theological virtue. I consider two upshots of my argument, including how my picture 
provides responses to common objections to Pascal’s wager. 
 





Should you believe in God? Proponents of Pascal’s wager argue yes, but for a different reason 
than the traditional theistic arguments provide. Proponents of the wager argue that you should 
believe in God because, by believing, you have much to gain and little to lose (see Table 1):  
 
 
Table 1: Pascal’s Wager 
 
If God exists, the value of believing in God is infinitely positive (given the possibility of going to 
heaven and having a relationship with and union with God), and the value of not believing is 
infinitely negative (given the possibility of going to hell and being separated from God). If God 
does not exist, the gains and losses associated with either course of action (f1 and f2) are both 
finite, and thus negligible in the face of infinite gains/losses. Thus, as long as one thinks that n, 
the probability that God exists, is non-zero (and non-infinitesimal), one practically ought to believe 
in God.  
 
The wager has been criticized on a variety of fronts, but I will set aside many classic objections for 
the purposes of this paper.1 Here, I’m concerned with a worry that has to do with the motives 
associated with taking the wager. Some claim that those that take Pascal’s wager are simply 
motivated by a fear of hell or a selfish desire to get the rewards of heaven. But these sorts of 
motives don’t seem to underlie a genuine theistic commitment. Furthermore, God wouldn’t be 
pleased with someone who takes Pascal’s wager because it’s associated with these bad motives. 
Then, it’s not even clear that believing in God for Pascalian reasons would realize the positive 
outcome reflected in Table 1.2  
 
To respond to this sort of objection, my goal in this paper is to show how taking Pascal’s wager 
need not reflect poor or selfish motives. What’s more, I argue that there’s a way of taking Pascal’s 
                                                        
1 A co-author and I respond to many other objections to Pascal's wager, such as the many gods objection, mixed 
strategies objection, and Pascal’s mugging, in Jackson and Rogers (2019). 
2 Proponents of an objection along these lines include Flew (1976), Mackie (1982: 203), Oppy (1991: 167), Golding 
(2018).  
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wager that demonstrates genuine faith. Second, I’ll argue that even if the wagerer’s confidence in 
theism is too low to demonstrate faith, taking the wager can demonstrate hope. I’ll show how, on 
both pictures, taking the wager expresses virtuous motives, and that both faith and hope can 
underlie a genuine and rational theistic commitment.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I’ll clarify what exactly counts as taking Pascal’s 
wager. Then, I’ll show how the wagerer has quite a bit in common with recent (plausible) accounts 
of religious faith, and argue that if one takes Pascal’s wager, one has faith that God exists. I then 
consider a few upshots of my argument. In Section 3, I’ll address hope, and how, if the wagerer 




2. Faithfully Taking Pascal’s Wager 
 
2.1 Taking Pascal’s Wager 
 
My goal in this paper isn’t to argue that it is impossible to take Pascal’s wager with poor motives. 
Of course this is possible. My goal is to carve out a way that one could take the wager virtuously, 
in a way that demonstrates genuine faith or genuine hope. Further, I’ll show how Pascalian 
reasoning can underlie and rationalize a genuine theistic commitment.  
 
What do I mean by “taking the wager”? Roughly, I mean something like the following:  
 
Taking Pascal’s Wager: making a commitment to God, largely motivated by non-
epistemic reasons. 
 
A few clarifications about this. First, “making a commitment to God” should be read broadly. It 
includes as least two ways of wagering—the doxastic wager, i.e. a belief-oriented wager that involves 
choosing to believe that God exists or taking steps to induce belief in God. The second is the 
acceptance wager, i.e. an action-oriented wager that involves accepting, or acting as if, God exists, and 
going to church, praying, reading Scripture, immersing oneself in a religious community, etc.3 Some 
have worried that the doxastic wager is problematic for various reasons—a common worry is that 
we don’t have the right kind of control over our beliefs. While I’m not convinced this objection is 
ultimately devastating for the doxastic wager, we need not take a stand on this here. So we can 
understand the wager in terms of belief or action.4  
 
Second, “non-epistemic” reasons include both practical and moral reasons. On the traditional 
version of the wager, the wagerer’s primary concerns are practical. However, Rota (2016) has 
recently argued that one might also wager for moral reasons, whether that be the well-being of 
those close to you, or even considerations about what God would desire or require, if God existed. 
Thus, the positive consequences associated with wagering can be either practical or moral.5 I say 
that the wagerer will be largely motivated by non-epistemic reasons because, a recent lesson from 
the literature on Pascal’s wager is that we must acknowledge that probability matters, even in the 
infinite case. This is for at least two reasons, One, the probability of God’s existence must be non-
zero (and non-infinitesimal) to even get the wager off the ground. Two, the most plausible 
                                                        
3 Rota (2016) defends the acceptance wager. 
4 Those who object to the doxastic wager include Mackie (1982: 201), Duff (1986: 108), Jordan (1998: 173, 2006: 38). 
I respond to these worries in Jackson (2021-a). 
5 See Jackson (2021-b) for an exception to this—a version of the wager that appeals to epistemic consequentialism, 
so the expected epistemic value of wagering gives one an epistemic reason to believe in God.  
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response to the many gods and mixed strategies objections to Pascal’s wager acknowledges that 
the probabilities of various religions matter—in deciding both whether to wager on God and what 
religion to wager on.6 So epistemic reasons have a role to play—even if not a starring role.  
 
Third, on the version of the wager I’m concerned with, the wagerer is motivated primarily by the 




Table 2: Why Take Pascal’s Wager 
 
The wagerer reasons that if God exists and they commit to God, that would be a very good thing. 
They realize that, if God existed—a powerful, good being who created the universe—God is 
someone they should want to pursue and make a commitment to. Thus, even the possibility God 
exists provides a strong reason to pursue a relationship with God, because knowing such a being 
would be so incredibly valuable.7 Whether this goodness is pragmatic, moral, or both, they 
maintain that committing to God if God exists would lead to a positive outcome, and this is the 
primary reason they wager. Once they commit, then they maintain that God's existence would be 
a good thing.8 After all, they’ve bet their life on it.  
 
2.2 The Nature of Faith 
 
Now, we turn to a second question, that may at first seem unrelated to Pascal’s wager: what is 
faith? More specifically, we’ll focus on the question: what is to have faith that a proposition is true?  
 
To answer this question, consider the difference between two kinds of mental states. Cognitive 
mental states have a mind-to-world direction of fit. They represent the world. They are normally 
truth-tracking, responsive to evidence, and evaluable from primarily an epistemic point of view. 
Examples of cognitive mental states include beliefs, credences, or probability-beliefs. 
 
Conative mental states, by contrast, have a world-to-mind direction of fit. They reflect what an agent 
takes to be desirable or valuable, and are inherently motivating. They needn’t involve evidence or 
epistemic justification for their contents. (I can desire that p, even knowing p is false—e.g. I desire 
a catastrophe never occurred, but I know it did. Of course, for the belief "p is good" to be justified, 
one needs evidence that p is good or desirable—but one doesn't need evidence that p is true.) 
Examples of conative mental states include desires, pro-attitudes, or beliefs about the good.  
 
With this distinction in mind, here’s a first pass at a definition of having faith that p (Howard-
Snyder 2013; Buchak 2017):  
 
S has faith that p iff:  
(i*) S has a positive conative attitude toward p (e.g. thinking p would be a good thing, 
desiring p) 
(ii*) S has a positive cognitive attitude toward p (e.g. thinking p is likely, having a high 
credence in p, believing p), and  
                                                        
6 See, e.g. Jackson & Rogers (2019) and Chen & Rubio (2020). 
7 See Benton (2018) for an argument that one could know God interpersonally without knowing that God exists. 
8 Relevant here is the axiology of theism literature, see Kraay (2018, forthcoming) and Lougheed (2020). 
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(iii*) S is resilient to new counterevidence against p.9 
 
Something similar to this definition is quite popular in the faith literature, and for good reason. It 
explains many cases of faith. Let’s suppose I have faith that you will win your upcoming basketball 
game. In this case, I want you to win—it doesn’t make sense to say I have faith you’ll win if I want 
you to lose. Further, I take it to be sufficiently likely that you will win—if I take it to be, say, 
impossible you’ll win, then I probably can’t (and definitely shouldn’t) have faith you’ll win. And 
finally, I will, to some extent, continue to have faith even in light of counterevidence—for example, 
if one of your starting players gets injured, I will continue to have faith that you’ll win. (This doesn’t 
mean I’ll have faith in light of any amount of counterevidence, especially if my faith is rational.)  
 
One might wonder about condition (ii*), especially in light of a recent debate in the faith literature: 
whether faith that p entails belief that p. The definition above lends itself to the idea that one can 
have faith that p without believing that p, since it’s natural to think that cognitive states besides 
belief can play the role of (ii*).10 This includes (but is not limited to): a high credence/high 
confidence in p, believing p is likely, thinking p is well-supported by evidence, thinking p is most 
likely of the alternatives, and thinking p is more likely than not.11 This raises several questions, 
including the question of how weak these cognitive attitudes can be (e.g. can a 0.4 credence play 
the relevant role?). We’ll return to this question later.12 I’ll also discuss versions of my view that fit 
with the idea that faith entails belief, so we can remain ecumenical on the relationship between 
belief and faith.  
 
A potential defect of the above definition is that it doesn’t capture the idea that faith seems to be 
deeply intertwined with, and underlie, many of our important life commitments. Faith is central 
to, e.g., upholding a new year’s resolution, the commitment that fans have to their sports teams, 
religious commitment, surviving a serious illness, marriage, or finishing graduate school (see 
Jackson forthcoming). I take a commitment to be action-oriented: roughly, a resolution to act in 
certain ways over a period of time. 
 
Now, a long-term commitment might not be associated with all cases of faith that p. I might have 
faith that a chair will hold me, but seemingly do not commit to that chair. Although, if the notion 
of commitment is very thin, perhaps I do have some kind of commitment to the chair. Further, if 
faith always involves commitment this seems to nicely explain why condition (iii*) holds, and faith 
is resilient to counterevidence. Either way, I won’t take a stand on the exact general relationship 
between faith and commitment. I’m interested in a particular case of faith: faith that God exists. 
And it’s much clearer that faith that God exists involves some kind of commitment to God, even 
if faith in general doesn’t. (Note that one could be a theist without having faith that God exists or 
a commitment to God. The claim isn't that merely believing that God exists involves a religious 
commitment. Rather, the claim is that those who have faith that God exists commit to God.) 
 
Summing up what we’ve discussed so far, S has faith that God exists if:  
(i) S has a positive conative attitude toward God’s existence (e.g. thinking God’s existence 
would be a good thing, desiring God’s existence) 
                                                        
9 Howard-Snyder (2013) adds a fourth condition: you need some kind of positive affective evaluation of p (e.g. 
positively valenced emotions toward p). These emotions may be commonly associated with faith, but in my view, they 
are either subsumed under condition (i*) or not strictly required (consider the Christian who “isn’t feeling it” but 
decides to, e.g. go to church, tithe, etc., anyway. Doing so seem to demonstrate faith, even if they lack the relevant 
emotions).  
10 That faith doesn’t entail belief is defended by Pojman (1986), Audi (1991, 2008, 2011), Alston (1996), among others. 
11 See Audi (2011), Howard Snyder (2013). 
12 For more on how weak the cognitive component of faith can be, see Jackson (2019).  
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(ii) S has a positive cognitive attitude toward God’s existence (e.g. thinking God’s existence is 
likely, having a high credence in God’s existence, believing that God exists),  
(iii) S is resilient to new counterevidence against God’s existence, and 
(iv) S commits to God.  
 
For my argument, I only need that (i)–(iv) are jointly sufficient for having theistic faith; I don’t need 
that they are necessary (and while they are widely regarded to be necessary, some have challenged 
this orthodoxy; see Malcolm and Scott 2021). This is because I will now argue that those who take 
Pascal’s wager have faith that God exists in virtue of satisfying these four conditions. In other 
words: at least a subset of the conditions that are sufficient for taking Pascal’s wager are sufficient for having faith 
that God exists. But this leaves open whether there are other ways to have faith that God exists (and 
of course, other ways to have faith in other propositions, or faith in general). And this is plausible, 
because not all with theistic faith are wagerers.  
 
2.3 The Faith of the Wagerer  
 
To sum up: we’ve seen first that those who take Pascal's wager commit to God, largely for non-
epistemic reasons, and they are motivated by the goodness of the outcome on which they commit 
to God and God exists. We’ve then seen that faith that God exists is a mental state with four 
components: cognitive, conative, resilience, and commitment.  
 
Those with faith that God exists and those who take Pascal’s wager, then, have much in 
common: 
(i) They have a positive conative attitude toward God's existence. 
(ii) They have a positive cognitive attitude toward God's existence. 
(iii) They are resilient to counterevidence to p (where this can be either a mental thing or an 
action-oriented thing). 
(iv) They make a commitment (i.e. to God, to live a particular kind of life). 
 
We’ve discussed how these characterize faith. But do these characterize taking Pascal’s wager? Yes. 
The wagerer has a positive conative attitude toward God's existence—they are motivated by the 
goodness of their committing to God, given God exists, and once they commit to God, they desire 
God to exist. They also have a positive cognitive attitude toward God's existence—recall that you 
shouldn't take the wager if your credence in theism is 0 (or infinitesimally small). The wagerer is 
plausibly also resilient to counterevidence to God’s existence, in part because their commitment is 
based on non-epistemic reasons. Since non-epistemic reasons keep them going, they can maintain 
their commitment to God even in light of counterevidence. And both the person of faith and the 
wagerer commit to God—whether this involves a doxastic wager (a commitment to believe in 
God) or an acceptance wager (a commitment to live as if God exists).  
 
Thus, if S takes Pascal’s wager (in the way described in sec. 2.1), S has faith that God exists.  
 
Two things to note about this claim. First, this claim is neutral on whether faith entails belief. If 
faith entails belief, my argument is simply limited to the doxastic wager.13 In other words, if one 
believes in God because of Pascal’s wager (either directly or via taking steps to induce belief), then 
one demonstrates genuine faith. While this raises the question of whether believing in God for 
this reason could be epistemically rationally—because if not, it would appear that whatever faith 
is demonstrated is importantly defective—I've argued that taking the doxastic wager can be 
epistemically (not merely practically) rational (see Jackson 2021-a).  
                                                        
13 Mugg (2016) and Malcolm and Scott (2016) argue that faith entails belief. 
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Second, as mentioned above, I'm not claiming having faith is sufficient for taking Pascal's wager. 
One may make a commitment to God primarily based on epistemic reasons, and thus not take 
Pascal’s wager but nonetheless have faith—if they have the right cognitive and conative attitudes, 
their commitment is resilient in light of counterevidence, etc. Again, I’m arguing that at least a 
subset of the conditions that are sufficient for taking Pascal's wager is sufficient for having faith, 
not that all who have theistic faith wager on God.14  
 
This brings me to two upshots of my argument. First, it is possible to take the wager with virtuous 
and honorable motives. The wagerer is motivated by the goodness of knowing God, if God exists, 
and, by wagering, demonstrates faith that God exists. Faith is a theological virtue and a central, if 
not the central, mark of a devoted religious life. Thus, I hope to have carved out a way of taking 
the wager that demonstrates virtuous motivates that would please God.  
 
Second, another objection that has been raised to Pascal's wager is the impossibility objection— 
taking the wager is impossible because (e.g.) one cannot force oneself to believe in God.15 
However, we’ve seen that taking Pascal’s wager demonstrates faith. And if faith, rather than belief, 
is what God requires, then those who wager won’t have to force themselves to believe.16 Rather, 
the commitment that results from taking Pascal’s wager will be sufficient, as it constitutes having 
faith. Of course, if one thinks the only legitimate way of wagering is the doxastic wager, or thinks 
that faith entails belief, then they made need an additional story about why we have more control 
over our beliefs than many philosophers think. Luckily, I’ve given an extensive argument for this 
elsewhere (Jackson 2021-a). 
 
 
3. Hopefully Taking Pascal’s Wager 
 
In this section, I explain how hope answers an outstanding objection to the above proposal. One 
might raise the following worry: even if faith doesn't entail belief, it doesn't seem like faith that 
God exists is consistent with any non-zero (non-infinitesimal) credence that God exists. For 
example, if someone has a 0.01 credence that God exists, it seems like having faith that God exists 
is impossible, or at the very least irrational. In this case, one might rationally take Pascal’s wager 
(even if the probability God exists is small, there’s nonetheless a lot to gain by wagering and little 
to lose by not wagering), but not count as having faith.  
 
Before turning to hope, note that faith may be consistent with quite low credences. This is most 
difficult to maintain if faith entails belief, but recently some have argued that rational belief is 
consistent with credences below 0.5.17 Further, if faith doesn’t entail belief, faith could be 
consistent with even lower credences than belief, as I argue in Jackson (2019). For example, it may 
be that you should only give up your faith in the face of certain types of evidence, but some kinds 
of evidence (like statistical evidence) can chip away at your credence but not require you to give 
up a belief. 
 
                                                        
14 If faith that God exists is inconsistent with credence 1 that God exists, then all those who have faith may be in 
some position of uncertainty, and in some sense thus wager on God. But I won’t take a stand on this here. 
15 Proponents of the impossibility objection to Pascal’s wager include Mackie (1982: 201), Duff (1986: 108), Jones 
(1998: 173). 
16 For evidence that faith, rather than belief, is what God requires for salvation, see Pojman (1986), Speak (2007), 
McKaughan (2017) and Howard-Snyder (2017).  
17 See Maher (1993: 183ff), Smith (2016: 72ff), Hawthorne et al (2016), Cevolani (2017), Jackson (2021-c). 
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Whether faith entails belief or not, the most popular and plausible response to the many-gods 
objection to Pascal’s wager says that, all else equal, you should pick the religion that is the most 
likely of the live options. In many cases, this might fulfill the relevant cognitive component of 
faith—as mentioned earlier, taking a possibility to be the most likely of the live options is a 
potential cognitive component of faith. Further, Hawthorne et al (2016) argue that rational belief is 
consistent with low credences in some cases when you believe the most likely of the live options 
(even if it is nonetheless somewhat unlikely in absolute terms). Of course, this doesn’t entail that 
one always ought to believe the most likely live possibility, but interestingly, this could be a case 
where faith and/or belief are consistent with credences below 0.5.  
 
My second response is that even if one’s credences are too low to count as having faith, the wagerer 
may nonetheless hope that God exists. Hope is similar to, but importantly distinct from, faith. On 
the standard view,  
 
S hopes that p iff  
(i) S has a positive conative attitude toward p, and  
(ii) S has a weak positive cognitive attitude toward p (e.g. a non-zero credence in p, a belief 
that p is possible).18 
 
Like faith, hope has a positive conative component. Hoping for p requires a desire for p to be true, 
a pro-attitude toward p, or a belief that p is very good. As Born (2018: 107) notes, ‘Hope is 
essentially a desire, a pro-attitude…’ Almost everyone in the hope literature maintains that a 
positive conative component is necessary for hope. However, the cognitive component of hope 
is much weaker than faith’s. In the case of faith, if one has a very low credence in p, one 
shouldn’t—and most wouldn’t—continue to have faith. But hope is uncontroversially consistent 
with very low credences—as long as they are non-zero. I’m using the phrase “weak positive 
cognitive attitude toward p” as a technical term, to pick out states that leave the possibility of p 
open, such as a non-zero credence in p and a belief that p is possible.19 
 
Consider some examples. If there’s a 95% chance of rain tomorrow but I have a picnic planned, I 
can hope it won’t rain tomorrow, since I want that to be true and take it to be possible. A loss of 
evidence may also cause one to move from faith to hope. Recall above the case where I had faith 
your basketball team will win an upcoming game. Suppose I get quite a bit of evidence you won’t 
win—maybe all of your starting five players get injured and cannot play. The probability you’ll 
win, then, is quite low. However, I can nonetheless hope that you will win—though it’s unlikely, 
my credence you’ll win isn’t zero, and I have a strong desire for you to win.  
 
Due to two puzzles about hope—one that involves distinguishing hope from despair, and another 
that involves explaining hope’s motivating power in difficult circumstances—some have argued 
that (i) and (ii), while necessary for hope, are not sufficient for hope. For example, Meirav (2009) 
argues that hope involves “an external factor”—an attitude towards some factor (e.g., nature, fate, 
God) on which the realization of the hoped-for end causally depends. Calhoun (2018) argues that 
hope provides the hopeful a “phenomenological idea of the future.” On Martin (2013)’s 
“incorporation” account of hope, the hopeful’s cognitive attitudes provide a “justificatory 
rationale” for related emotions and actions. Finally, Chignell (2021)'s "focus theory" of hope entails 
that hoping involves special attention to the hoped-for outcome.  
                                                        
18 Downie (1963: 248); Day (1969: 89); see Milona (2019) for a recent defense of the standard view. For an overview 
of the nature and rationality of hope, see Rioux (forthcoming-a).  
19 Note that hope is consistent with high credences, but (arguably) not maximally high—it seems odd to hope that p 
if you are certain that p. Then, as Martin (2013: 69) notes, hope that p is consistent with any credence in p between, 
but excluding, 1 and 0. 
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I maintain that Pascal’s wager is sufficient for hope. Fortunately, when one commits to God based 
on Pascal's wager, motivated by the goodness of the outcome of God's existence, they plausibly 
satisfy these extra conditions that, in conjunction with (i) and (ii), are sufficient for hope. The 
wagerer is committed to God as the external factor on which their hope depends. In virtue of their 
commitment to God, they exemplify Calhoun’s “phenomenological idea of the future”, and the 
relevant actions and emotions of Martin’s account are justified for them.20 Finally, as described in 
2.1, the wagerer also plausibly pays special attention to the hoped-for outcome (namely, that God 
exists), as Chignell’s theory describes.  
 
This brings me to my ultimate and final thesis: if one takes Pascal’s wager, then one either has faith 
that God exists or hopes that God exists. This is significant both in and of itself, but also because 
faith and hope are theological virtues. I aim to have dispelled the idea that taking Pascal's wager is 
inherently selfish or demonstrates poor motivates. On the contrary: on a natural way of taking the 
wager, the wagerer exemplifies theological virtues. Taking the wager is thus not only virtuous, but 
also plausibly something that would be pleasing to God. 
 
Before I conclude, I’ll consider one final worry. If one’s taking the wager merely demonstrates 
hope that God exists, does this answer the impossibility objection discussed above? In other 
words, does merely hoping that God exists lead to the good outcome of the shaded box in Table 
2? To be maximally charitable to the objector, I'll assume that we are dealing with a hopeful person 
who takes the acceptance wager, rather than the doxastic wager. In response, first, note that going 
from completely uncommitted to committed to God and hoping that God exists at least raises the 
probability that one is saved and will receive the goods of heaven. It’s difficult to be certain of the 
exact requirements for salvation (a subject of theological debate—e.g. universalists maintain that 
all will be saved, and even non-universalists disagree about the precise soteriological requirements. 
Belief that God exists is almost definitely not strictly necessary; e.g. young children who die before 
they have the capacity to believe in God are likely saved, even without belief). All we may be able 
to do is raise the probability of getting the good outcome of the shaded box. Second, salvation 
may not be the only good the wagerer is concerned with; the wagerer may also be interested in, 
e.g. the benefits of pursuing God during their earthly life. Or one might wager for moral reasons, 
concerning God and others, as discussed above. Finally, the hopeful wagerer might, as they 
continue in their commitment to God, eventually come to have faith and/or belief that God exists. 
So the hopeful wagerer puts themselves on a path to satisfy even the most stringent requirements 





I’ve argued that if one takes Pascal’s wager, then one either has faith that God exists or hopes that 
God exists. First, I’ve clarified what exactly counts as “taking Pascal’s wager.” Then, I’ve shown 
why it is plausible that if one takes Pascal’s wager, motivated by the goodness of the possibility 
that God exists, one has faith that God exists. I’ve shown why this is significant: it shows that is 
possible to take the wager with virtuous motives, and offers a response to the impossibility 
objection to Pascal’s wager. Then, I’ve addressed hope, and argued that even if the wagerer doesn’t 
meet the requirements for having faith, she may nonetheless have hope. I’ve shown why hope is 
theologically (and even potentially soteriologically) significant.  
 
 
                                                        
20 See Jackson (forthcoming) and Rioux (forthcoming-b) for more on how hope justifies action and commitment. 
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